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VIRGINIA AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, 1789-1791
J. Gordon Hylton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historians and constitutional scholars have paid scant attention
to the process by which the states ratified the Bill of Rights.' The
states' ratifying conventions of 1787 and 1788 have been examined
in great detail, as have the debates of the first Congress which led
to the presentation of the Bill of Rights to the states. Scholars,
however, have treated the ratification of the first ten amendments
as little more than an historical formality.2 Why more than two full
years passed between the Congressional adoption of the proposed
amendments and the approval by the requisite number of states
has never been adequately answered.3
This cursory treatment is unwarranted. A detailed examination
of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in Virginia reveals that the
matter was anything but perfunctory. The debate it engendered
was part of a much larger contest over the future of the American
constitutional experiment, a contest that began at the Philadelphia
convention and was not resolved by the state's ratification of the
United States Constitution in the summer of 1787. It was still not
resolved in the fall of 1789, when the antifederalist Virginia legisla-
ture refused to approve the Bill of Rights; nor was it resolved two
* Assistant Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law; A.B.,
1974, Oberlin College; J.D., 1977, University of Virginia; Ph.D., 1986, Harvard University.
1. See R. BEEMAN, S. BOTEIN, & E. CARTER, BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CON-
STITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (1987) [hereinafter BEYOND CONFEDERATION];
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: THE HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (P. Murphy ed. 1990) [hereinafter HISTORIC BACKGROUND]; E. DUMBAULD, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1957); THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AN
ILLUSTRATED SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter THE
ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS]; R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791
(1983); Bowling, A Tub to the Whale: The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal
Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988).
2. See, e.g., E. DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 49-50 (discussing the ratification process in a
single sentence); R. RUTLAND, supra note 1, at 213-15 (devoting less than three pages to the
subject); Bowling, supra note 1, at 247-50 (covering the topic in only four pages).
3. Tarter, Virginians and the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 3
(J. Kukla ed. 1987).
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years later, when Virginia reluctantly ratified the Bill of Rights.
Virginia played a pivotal role in the planning and ratification of
the Bill of Rights. The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted
by George Mason and adopted at the time the colony declared its
independence from Great Britain, was the first American bill of
rights. In 1787, it was the refusal of Mason and his fellow Virginia
delegate, Edmund Randolph, to sign the proposed Constitution at
the conclusion of the Philadelphia Convention that highlighted the
need for a national bill of rights, and it was Virginia's James
Madison who introduced one on the floor of the first Congress.
Later, in the fall of 1791, it was Virginia that provided the critical
eleventh vote necessary for ratification.
The Virginians who initially rejected the Bill of Rights were,
with few exceptions, the same individuals who had earlier opposed
the new United States Constitution. Their position was not that a
bill of rights was unnecessary; in fact, their original complaints
about the Constitution had included the absence of a bill of rights.
Nor did they find any of the specific rights enumerated in the pro-
posed amendments objectionable. The problem, as they saw it, was
that the Congressional amendments did not go far enough. The
amendments failed to provide necessary checks on the power of
the central government, and they offered state-based minorities
too little protection from a potentially hostile national majority.
Even when new political alignments growing out of the events of
1789 to 1791 made ratification acceptable, the adoption of the
amendments was accompanied by little confidence that they pro-
vided any true protection against the excesses of national power.
II. THE VIRGINIA RATIFICATION CONVENTION
The Virginia debate over the Bill of Rights was a direct out-
growth of events that occurred during the ratifying convention of
1789.4 When the Virginia General Assembly convened in the fall of
4. This convention is one of the most carefully studied events in Virginia history. See,
e.g., R. BEEMAN, THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION, 1788-1801 1-11 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter OLD DOMINION]; R. BEEMAN, PATRICK HENRY: A BIOGRAPHY 213-69 (1971) [hereinafter
PATRICK HENRY]; I. BRANT, MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800 185-228
(1950); THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot ed. 1886) [hereinafter THE DEBATES]; 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds.
1981) [hereinafter Vol. 8 Kaminski & Saladino]; 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATI-
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES (J. Kaminsky & G. Saladino eds. 1981) [here-
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1787 to discuss the proposed United States Constitution, support-
ers and opponents alike agreed that Virginia's ratifying convention
should be scheduled as late as possible in 1788, so that the state
would be in a position to act decisively.5 When the convention
opened on June 2, this desire was realized. Eight of the necessary
nine states had ratified, but significant antifederalist sentiment ex-
isted in the other four.6
Delegates to the Virginia convention appeared to be almost
evenly divided between supporters and opponents, with a small
but critical number of delegates undecided. Uncertain also, was
the number of delegates who would be willing to support the new
Constitution if ratification was conditioned on the inclusion of cer-
tain amendments. Virginia politics in the 1780's had possessed a
distinctly sectional flavor, and attitudes toward the new Constitu-
tion generally split along geographic lines.' Tidewater, the North-
ern Neck, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Alleghenies were
inafter Vol. 9 Kaminski & Saladino]; H. GRIGSBY, THE HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1788 (1969) (The first edition was published 1890-1891); R. KETCHAM, JAMES
MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 231-69 (1971); D. MAYS, 2 EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721-1803: A BIOGRA-
PHY 228-72 (1952); F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 255-83 (1958); N. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800 (1978) (incorporating a
number of influential earlier studies by the same author); R. RUTLAND, supra note 1, at 182-
253; Banning, "To Secure These Rights:" Patrick Henry, James Madison and the Revolu-
tionary Legitimacy of the Constitution, in To SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: FIRST
PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION 280 (S. Thurow ed. 1987) [hereinafter Banning, To Secure
These Rights]; Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION (M. Gillespie, & M. Lienesch eds. 1989) [hereinafter Banning, Virginia];
Briceland, Virginia: The Cement of the Union, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE
ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION (D. Conley & J. Kaminski eds. 1988); Thomas, The Virginia Convention of 1788: A
Criticism of Beard's AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 19 J. S. HIST.
(1953).
5. N. RISJORD, supra note 4, at 300.
6. Delaware, Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Jersey, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Mary-
land, and Connecticut had ratified the Constitution; New York, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island had not. The New York and New Hampshire conventions were
also in session during the summer of 1788, and both ratified. New Hampshire ratified before
Virginia, and New York ratified after Virginia.
7. This article refers to the supporters of the proposed constitution as "federalists" and to
their opponents as "antifederalists." Although it is now conventional to use the upper case
"Federalists" and "Antifederalists," such use creates a misleading impression of a high de-
gree of political and organizational cohesion resembling that of a political party, which these
alignments were not.
8. See Hylton, James Madison, Virginia Politics, and the Bill of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 275 (1990); Main, Sections and Politics in Virginia, 1781-1787, 12 WM. & MARY Q.
96 (3d Series 1955); Risjord & DenBoer, The Evolution of Political Parties in Virginia
1782-1800, 60 J. AM. HIsT. 961 (1974).
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predominantly in support of the Constitution, while the Southside,
the Southwest, and Kentucky were generally opposed. Only in the
Virginia Piedmont, north of the James River, was sentiment ap-
parently equally divided. 9 To a great extent, this split paralleled
the division on matters of state economic policy that had preoccu-
pied the Virginia General Assembly between 1776 and 1787.10
For three weeks, the convention considered the merits of the
proposed Constitution. The actual debate was carried on by a
group that included only twenty-one of the 170 delegates. The re-
mainder were silent throughout the proceedings, and, for all practi-
cal purposes, a dozen individuals dominated the convention." The
antifederalists were led by the already legendary Patrick Henry
whose speeches alone account for one quarter of the delibera-
tions.12 Throughout the spring of 1787, Henry's ability to persuade
those within the sound of his voice was a cause for concern among
the leaders of the pro-Constitution forces, and Henry spoke to vir-
tually every issue before the convention.' 3 No single individual so
dominated the federalist position, but James Madison was gener-
ally understood to be this group's principle spokesman. 4
Early on, it became clear that the federalist group could lay
claim to a majority of the delegates, but a majority so narrow that
they could not risk forcing an early vote for fear of alienating some
of the less committed majority members. Consequently, both sides
agreed to a clause-by-clause debate of the proposed Constitution.
In spite of the agreement, both sides spent the first twelve days
directing their remarks to the general desirability of a new
constitution. 5
As part of their strategy to wrest away the support of part of the
federalist group, the antifederalist leaders, principally Henry, Ma-
son, and William Grayson of Prince William County, seized upon
9. See Briceland, supra note 4, at 210; N. RISJORD, supra note 4, at 316 (demonstrating
that voting at the Ratification Convention followed regional patterns).
10. Hylton, supra note 8. There were, however, some important exceptions to this general
rule. Many antifederalist leaders, including George Mason, William Grayson, and Richard
Henry Lee, had sided with the "Northern Neck" position during the legislative debates of
the 1780's. However, their concern over northern-state dominance under the new constitu-
tion ultimately pushed them into the antifederalist camp.
11. Briceland, supra note 4, at 212.
12. Id. at 211.
13. PATRICK HENRY, supra note 4, at 143-44.
14. Briceland, supra note 4, at 212.
15. Id. at 217.
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the plan to delay ratification until the Constitution could be
amended, presumably by a second constitutional convention. To
accomplish this objective, the group began to draft amendments at
the end of the first week of the convention, ultimately producing a
bill of rights containing twenty provisions that was ready for circu-
lation on June 11.16 These amendments were modeled on Mason's
Virginia Declaration of Rights, although certain material changes
were made, including the deletion of two provisions in the original
and the addition of six new sections. 7
These amendments spoke to Mason's primary concern, the pro-
tection of individual liberties against government infringement,
but they did not address what many antifederalists considered to
be a more fundamental defect of the proposed constitution. Al-
though the need for a Bill of Rights had been a hallmark of anti-
federalist thought, it was not the primary concern of Henry and
Grayson nor most of the antifederalist block at the convention.'
Henry himself at times even appeared to agree with the federalist
argument that a Bill of Rights was undesirable, because an enu-
meration of rights could be interpreted as a denial of the existence
of other rights not included in the enumeration. 19 In response to
federalist George Wythe's suggestion that antifederalist concerns
could be allayed by a single amendment guaranteeing freedom of
press and religion and other essential liberties, Henry argued,
"when you go into an enumeration of your rights, and stop that
enumeration, the inevitable conclusion is, that what is omitted is
intended to be surrendered."20
The primary antifederalist objection instead was that the new
Constitution provided far too little protection for state sover-
eignty.21 The principal problem was not that the national govern-
16. Id. The amendment strategy did not originate at the Convention. Virginia representa-
tive Richard Henry Lee had attempted to attach several amendments to the proposed Con-
stitution before it was approved by the Confederation Congress. See Bowling, supra note 1,
at 225.
17. Briceland, supra note 4, at 217.
18. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 540-43 (1969) (discussing the
place of the Bill of Rights in antifederalist thought).
19. See id. at 539-40.
20. 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 594.
21. Id. In December of 1787, Madison had forecast a potential split in antifederalist ranks
between those, like Mason, who generally approved of the new Constitution but favored "a
few additional guards in favor of the Rights of the States and of the People," and those, like
Henry, who opposed any increase in federal power and were willing to use the amendments
issue to bring down the new Constitution. 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 310, 312 (1952)
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ment would tread upon the rights of individual citizens, but that a
national majority, particularly a northern majority, could someday
strip the citizens of Virginia of their collective rights of self-gov-
ernment. To address these concerns, a second list of amendments
was prepared to guarantee that the sovereign rights of the states
would be protected and that one region of the United States might
not impose its will on another simply by possessing a majority of
the population. The second set of amendments limited the power
of Congress to enact commercial legislation and raise military
forces, placed restrictions on its ability to forcibly collect taxes,
prohibited the establishment of lower federal courts for any pur-
pose other than admiralty, and otherwise restricted the powers of
the new central government.22
On June 24, fearing that a prolonged convention might lead to
an antifederalist triumph, the pro-Constitution leadership moved
for a vote on unconditional approval. It was at this point that
Henry presented both sets of amendments and proposed that the
convention vote to delay its ratification until after the Constitution
had been amended by a second convention.23 After a brief debate
on the merits of Henry's proposals, James Madison rose and deliv-
ered the master stroke of the convention. Instead of opposing
Henry's proposals, as he had throughout the convention, Madison
announced that he would be willing to recommend some amend-
ments once the Constitution was adopted, "not because they are
necessary, but because they can produce no possible danger." '24
The following day, June 25, the convention voted on ratification
with 168 of 170 delegates present. Although the initial motion by
George Nicholas called for unconditional ratification, it was
quickly amended by Henry's supporters to make ratification condi-
tional upon the adoption of Henry's proposed amendments. In
what proved to be the critical vote of the convention, the amended
motion failed by a vote of eighty to eighty-eight.25 Immediately
thereafter, the convention ratified the Constitution without reser-
vation, by a vote of eighty-nine to seventy-nine, with only one
[hereinafter all volumes to be cited as MADISON PAPERS] (letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787)).
22. For the full text of these amendments, see Appendix I.
23. See I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 220-25.
24. Id. at 225-26; Briceland, supra, note 4, at 219-20.
25. See I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 224-26; Briceland, supra note 4, at 219-20.
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delegate switching his vote.2" After the defeat of a motion to strike
out the preamble to the Constitution, the convention authorized
the appointment of two committees, the first committee would pre-
pare the formal resolution of ratification to be sent to Congress,
and the second "[would] report such amendments as by them shall
be deemed necessary. 2
7
The second committee was chaired by College of William and
Mary law professor George Wythe and included eleven supporters
and nine opponents of the new Constitution. Its ranks included
such notable federalists as James Madison, John Marshall, and
Governor Edmund Randolph, who had resolved his earlier reserva-
tions about the new constitution, as well as antifederalists Patrick
Henry, George Mason, and James Monroe. When the committee
reported to the convention two days later, its proposals clearly rep-
resented a victory for its antifederalist minority. In spite of
Madison's efforts to eliminate a number of the most "objectiona-
ble" of Henry's amendments, his federalist colleagues had been un-
willing to risk a confrontation.2s Having achieved the ratification of
the Constitution, most federalist members of the committee had
no desire to provoke the convention by appearing hostile to
amendments, particularly since antifederalist Benjamin Harrison
had on the day of the final vote predicted that the federalist prom-
ise of support for subsequent amendments would disappear as
soon as the Constitution was ratified.29
The committee proposed a total of forty amendments." The first
twenty constituted a bill of rights and were essentially those pre-
pared by Mason earlier in the convention. The second set was an
expanded version of Henry's proposals of two days earlier. Individ-
ual amendments in the second group would place tight restrictions
on the new national government. These amendments emphasized
that the new federal government was restricted to powers specifi-
cally delegated to it by the main text of the Constitution. The
amendments also provided for the publication of the deliberations
of the United States Congress and a full accounting of all public
moneys, as well as required a two-thirds vote in the Senate for the
26. 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 654-55.
27. Id. at 362.
28. R. KETCHAM, supra note 4, at 264.
29. Briceland, supra note 4, at 220.
30. 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 657-62. For the full text of these amendments, see
Appendix I.
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approval of any commercial treaty and a three-quarters vote for
any treaty "ceding, contracting, restraining, or suspending, the ter-
ritorial rights or claims of the United States or any [state].'31
The proposed amendments also required a two-thirds vote of
each house of Congress for any law regulating commerce or for any
law establishing a standing army in peacetime, prohibited military
enlistments for more than four years, preserved the rights of the
states to preserve their own militia, and limited the presidential
term of any individual to no more than eight years in any sixteen
year period.2 Other amendments limited the jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, prohibited the creation of lower fed-
eral courts for matters other than admiralty, prohibited Congress
from controlling the election of representatives and senators and
from giving its members raises that take effect prior to the next
scheduled election, restricted the right of Congress to raise judicial
salaries, and removed from the Senate the right to try impeach-
ments of its own members. Perhaps most importantly, one amend-
ment required that before Congress could implement a direct tax,
it had to first request an amount proportional to its population
from each state, and if the state paid its quota on time, the taxes
adopted by Congress could not be collected in that state.33
Once the committee report was presented to the convention, fed-
eralists in the body singled out the prohibition on direct taxes as
the provision most vulnerable to challenge. At this point, a number
of the committee's antifederalist members returned to a more con-
frontational position. A motion to strike the taxation amendment
was supported by most of the federalist members of the commit-
tee, including Wythe and Madison. However, at least twelve mem-
bers of the federalist coalition, including two members of the com-
mittee, broke ranks and voted with the antifederalists, so the
motion to strike failed. 4
31. 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 660.
32. Id. at 657.
33. Id. at 657-61.
34. Id. at 661-62. The motion failed by a vote of either 65 to 85 or 65 to 80. The records of
the convention list the former, but the list of individual votes contains the names of only 80
opponents. If the latter is complete, the vote on the motion to strike the proposed taxation
amendment reveals the following: Of the 88 delegates who opposed Henry's June 23 motion
to condition ratification upon prior amendment, 65 supported the motion to strike the taxa-
tion amendment, 12 opposed it, and 11 failed to vote, presumably because they had already
left the convention. The most prominent of the "defectors" was convention president Ed-
mund Pendleton. On the antifederalist side, no supporter of Henry's motion voted in favor
of the motion to strike, 68 opposed it, and 12 failed to vote. Of the committee members
[Vol. 25:433
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The unsuccessful 'effort to strike the proposed amendment on
taxation revealed the shaky nature of the federalist coalition and
dissuaded its leaders from challenging any of the remaining
amendments. It also revealed that the prevailing sentiment in the
convention was in opposition to a much more powerful central gov-
ernment. Had the shift of the twelve votes occurred at the time of
Henry's original motion, the new constitution would have failed by
a vote of ninety-two to seventy-six. The convention closed by au-
thorizing that copies of both the letter of ratification and the pro-
posed amendments be transmitted to the United States Congress,
the executive or legislature of every state, and to every Virginia
county. 5
III. THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE RESPONDS, FALL 1788
In the summer of 1788, there were many reasons to believe that
substantial amendments of the recently adopted Constitution
would be forthcoming. Virginia was hardly alone in having coupled
its ratification with a call for amendments. Massachusetts, South
Carolina, and New Hampshire had done so prior to the end of the
Virginia Convention, and when New York ratified the Constitution
on July 26, by a vote of only thirty to twenty-seven, it issued a
circular calling for a second convention to consider additional
amendments.3 6 On August 2, North Carolina adopted a list of
amendments even more extensive than those proposed by Virginia,
and opposed ratification until the Constitution was amended by a
second convention.3 7
A number of the Virginia federalists feared that their recent ac-
complishments might soon unravel. The day the convention con-
cluded, Madison wrote to George Washington that he feared his
opponents would use the issue of amendments to gain control of
the new government, in order "to get a Congress appointed in the
first instance that will commit suicide on its own authority."38 This
themselves, seven of the 12 federalists supported the motion, two opposed it, and two failed
to vote. Eight of nine antifederalist members opposed the motion, and the other failed to
vote. Id. at 662.
35. Id. at 663.
36. Id. at 413-14; see also 8 Kaminski & Saladino, supra note 4, at xx-xxi (providing basic
dates and information).
37. See generally 4 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 251-52 (regarding North Carolina's
ratification).
38. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 182-83 (letter from James Madison to George
Washington (June 27, 1788)).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
was, in fact, the intention of Patrick Henry, who vowed to "seize
the first moment that offered for shaking off the yoke in a consti-
tutional way." '39 Two months later, Madison wrote to Thomas Jef-
ferson that he was convinced that Henry and his allies from the
southern part of Virginia would lead a drive for "an early Conven-
tion composed of men who will essentially mutilate the System,
particularly in the article of taxation, without which in my opinion
the system cannot answer the purposes for which it intended. ' '40
Much to the dismay of Madison the idea of a second convention
was quickly endorsed, not just by militants like Henry, but also by
more moderate antifederalists like James Monroe. More embar-
rassingly, a number of federalists also endorsed the idea, including
Edmund Pendleton, the convention president, and Governor Ed-
mund Randolph, whose switch to the federalist side had been so
crucial at the convention.41
As Madison feared, when the Virginia General Assembly con-
vened in October, 1788, Henry and his antifederalist allies were in
complete control. Although John Beckley, the clerk of the House of
Delegates, estimated that the antifederalists possessed a fifteen-
vote majority in the 168-man assembly, the antifederalist plan for
a second constitutional convention was supported by approxi-
mately two-thirds of the delegates. 42 Moreover, virtually none of
the leaders of the federalist bloc at the ratifying convention were
present in the Assembly. Madison was in the Continental Con-
gress, George Wythe was on the bench, and George Washington
and George Nicholas were temporarily retired from public life. 43
After demonstrating its ability to unseat federalist Edward Car-
rington by invoking a rule that prevented members of the legisla-
ture from holding office under the continental government, the an-
39. Id. at 183. At the conclusion of the Virginia Convention, Henry had announced, "My
hand and my heart shall be at liberty to retrieve the loss of liberty, and remove the defects
of the system, in a constitutional way." 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 4, at 652.
40. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 238 (letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788)).
41. Id. at 231-32 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Aug. 13, 1788)); id.
at 246-47 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Sept. 3, 1788)) (an admittedly
tentative endorsement).
42. Id. at 314-15 (letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Oct. 24, 1788)); id. at
336-37 (letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 9, 1788)); id. 381-84 (letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 8, 1788)); see OLD DOMINION, supra note 4,
at 14.
43. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 323 (letter from Richard Bland Lee to James
Madison (Oct. 29, 1788)); see OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 15-17.
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tifederalist majority began to undo the results of the previous
Convention.44 On October 30, Henry moved that the legislature call
for a second convention to consider amendments proposed by Vir-
ginia and other states. 45 A federalist effort to amend the resolution,
by providing that Congress be given the first opportunity to act on
the Virginia amendments, was defeated by better than a two-to-
one margin.46 The original resolution then passed without a re-
corded vote.47
The antifederalists' next step was to ensure that both of Vir-
ginia's United States senators would be devoted to the principle of
state sovereignty and committed to the drastic alteration of the
Constitution. For these two positions, which were elected by the
state legislature until the adoption of the seventeenth amendment
in 1913, the antifederalists nominated William Grayson and Rich-
ard Henry Lee.48 Realizing that they were too weak to compete for
both positions, the federalists advanced James Madison as their
only candidate. Their strategy called for each federalist delegate to
use only one of his two votes, and then rely upon Madison's repu-
tation as a man of ability to attract some antifederalist votes.49
The plan failed, however, as Madison's candidacy was openly at-
tacked by Patrick Henry and others, who viewed his "federal polit-
ics" as "adverse to the opinions of many members" and believed
that, if chosen, he would be unlikely to follow legislative instruc-
tions on the matter of direct taxation.50 When the legislature voted
44. JOURNAL OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF 1788 at 4 (Oct. 23 & 24, 1788)
[hereinafter, HOUSE JOURNAL]; 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 312 (letter from Ed-
ward Carrington to James Madison (Oct. 24, 1788)). Some federalists had already antici-
pated Carrington's ouster. Id. at 311-12 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison).
45. Although the House records do not identify the author of the proposal, both Richard
Beeman and Norman Risjord attribute this resolution to Patrick Henry. Old Dominion,
supra note 4, at 16-17; Risjord, supra note 4.
46. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44 (Oct. 30, 1788). Forty-four delegates were either ab-
sent or chose not to participate in the 39 to 85 vote. Id.
47. Id. at 13. According to George Lee Turberville, the vote on this resolution was also 85-
39. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 340 (letter from George Lee Turberville to James
Madison (Nov. 8, 1788)).
48. See OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 18.
49. This election strategy was discussed in a letter written by Edmund Randolph just
prior to the balloting. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 336 (letter from Edmund Ran-
dolph to James Madison (Nov. 5, 1788)).
50. Id. at 338-39 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 10, 1788)).
Henry also reportedly proclaimed that Madison was "unworthy of the confidence of the
people in the station of Senator," and that his election would "terminate in rivulets of blood
throughout the land." Id. at 335-37 (letter from Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 19,
1788)).
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on November 8, Madison finished third, garnering seventy-seven
votes to eighty-six for Grayson and ninety-eight for Lee.51 Henry,
who was not a candidate, received twenty-six votes. 52 A total of 164
legislators, an unusually high number, cast ballots.53
The following week, the antifederalist majority used its power to
draw the lines of the new congressional districts in such a way as
to give their candidates maximum advantage.54 Anticipating that
James Madison would be a candidate for election to the new Con-
gress, his home county of Orange was attached to a number of cen-
tral Virginia counties in which Henry and the antifederalist Cabell
family were believed to have large followings.5 5 Moreover, to pre-
vent Madison from moving to a friendlier part of the state, the
antifederalist majority enacted a requirement that candidates had
to reside in their districts for twelve months prior to the election.5"
51. Id. at 339 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 10, 1788)); see also
JOURNAL OF THE VIRGINIA STATE SENATE OF 1788, at 20 (Nov. 8, 1788), [hereinafter SENATE
JOURNAL]; HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 24 (both Houses reporting only the winners).
52. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 51, at 20 (Nov. 8, 1788); HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44,
at 24 (Nov. 8, 1788); 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 341 (letter from Edward Car-
rington to James Madison (Nov. 12, 1788)). Henry had declined to have his name placed in
nomination, according to Governor Edmund Randolph, because he was unwilling to take an
oath to support the new Constitution. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 312 (letter
from Edmond Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 23, 1788)).
53. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 339 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James
Madison (Nov. 10, 1788) (reporting that 164 legislators voted)). Further, Madison received
numerous single votes, i.e. although all voters were entitled to cast two ballots, several who
voted for Madison used their other vote for an individual who was not nominated. Id. Votes
for those not nominated were not included in the count. Id. at 336 (letter from Edward
Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 9, 1788)). Turberville indicated Madison received 63
single votes. Id. at 340 (letter from George Turberville to James Madison (Nov. 10, 1788)).
However, Carrington's letter reports that the total number of legislators voting was 162, and
that Madison received 62 single votes. Id. at 336 (letter from Edward Carrington to James
Madison (Nov. 9, 1788)). Mathematically, the most accurate account of the events appears
to be that 162 voted, with 63 single votes for Madison. (The votes for nominees Grayson
(86), Lee (98) and Madison (77) total 261. Backtracking, if 162 legislators voted, but there
were 63 single votes, this would leave 99 legislators casting 2 votes. Thus, 2 x 99 = 198 votes
attributable to those legislators, plus the 63 single votes, equals the 261 total votes which
counted).
54. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 19; HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 40 (Nov. 13,
1788).
55. Id.
56. I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 238; OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 19; see also HOUSE
JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 31 (Nov. 13, 1788) (the bill passed and was titled, "An act for the
election of Representatives, pursuant to the Constitution of Government of the United
States"). Although most historians believe that the majority in the General Assembly used
its power to place Madison in a congressional district in which antifederalist sentiment pre-
vailed, Norman Risjord argues that there is no hard evidence to support this claim. N. Ris-
JORD, supra note 4, at 326. Many of Madison's supporters clearly hold this view. See, e.g., 11
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An attempt to repeal this provision, sponsored by Madison's sup-
porter and confidant, Edward Carrington, was defeated by a vote
of thirty-two to eighty.57
On November 14, the legislature entertained three additional
proposals from Patrick Henry.58 The first proposal was an address
to Congress expressing Virginia's displeasure with the new consti-
tution in its present form and the desire for a second constitutional
convention to correct the current defects.5 9 The second proposal
authorized a favorable reply to the letter of New York Governor
George Clinton, which called for a second constitutional conven-
tion, and the third proposal provided for a circular letter to be sent
to the other states on behalf of that cause. 0 A federalist-sponsored
alternative, designed to endorse the amendments proposed by the
Virginia convention in 1787, but to do so in language less hostile to
the existing national government, fooled no one in the antifederal-
ist camp and failed in a vote of seventy-two to fifty.6 1 The original
proposal was then adopted by voice vote.2
The adoption of Henry's proposals did not end antifederalist ef-
forts in the 1788 legislative session. In early December, opponents
of the new national government secured the election of an antifed-
eralist governor (Beverley Randolph), and, as a final gesture,
adopted, by a 71-52 vote, a bill that prohibited federal office-hold-
ers (including soldiers in the national militia) from holding state
office."3 Although he actually made the observation in mid-Novem-
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 343-44 (letter from George Lee Turberville to James
Madison (Nov. 13, 1788)); id. at 345-46 (letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison
(Nov. 15 [actually 14], 1788)).
57. HousE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 42-43 (Nov. 14, 1788).
58. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 42-43 (Nov. 14, 1788); see also 11 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 348 (letter from Richard Bland Lee to James Madison (Nov. 17, 1788))
(indicating that Patrick Henry sponsored these proposals); OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at
20-21.
59. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 31-32 (Nov. 14, 1788).
60. Id.; see also 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 348 (letter from Richard Bland Lee
to James Madison (Nov. 17, 1788)); OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 20-21.
61. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 32 (Nov. 14, 1788) (official record stating that 72
delegates voted against the motion, but lists the names of only 71 dissenters. In a letter to
Madison, Edward Carrington reported the result as 49 yeas and 71 nays. 11 MADISON PA-
PERS, supra note 21, at 345 (letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 15
[actually 14], 1788)).
62. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 33 (Nov. 14, 1788).
63. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 48 (Dec. 3, 1788), at 50 (Dec. 8, 1788). The previous
governor, Edmund Randolph, had decided not to seek reelection and had reentered the
state legislature. 11 MASON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 271 (letter from John Dawson to
James Madison (Sept. 30, 1788)). Beverley Randolph defeated Benjamin Harrison by four
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ber, George Turberville summed up the events of the 1788 legisla-
tive session for his federalist colleagues when he bemoaned, "[tihe
triumph of Antifederalism is compleat [sic]."" Theodorick Bland,
speaking from the perspective of the victors, boasted, "[t]he gen-
tlemen on the federal side, .. . finding themselves stript [sic] of the
Lion's skin, with great dexterity put on the Fox's tail, but neither
art or strength would avail them."65
Throughout the session, little attention was paid to the specific
need for a bill of rights for the new national Constitution. Since
the federalist position was still that no additional amendments
were necessary, the federalists lacked the incentive to raise the is-
sue. The antifederalists, on the other hand, while still believing
that a bill of rights was necessary, were under no illusions that
such a measure would remedy the defects of the new Constitution
by itself. The ability of Congress to dominate the states through its
control of taxation, commerce, and the army was the immediate
threat, and one that could be met only by substantive amendments
restricting it powers.
This attitude was consonant with the view of "rights" shared by
most Virginians who embraced the antifederalist cause. As Chief
Justice John Marshall would later observe, the antifederalists be-
lieved that "liberty" would not be encroached by the government
acting directly against individuals but "could only be endangered
by encroachments upon the states; and that it was the great duty
of patriotism to restrain the powers of the general government
within the narrowest possible limits.""6 A bill of rights, standing
alone, could not accomplish this task.
votes. Harrison was also identified with the antifederalist cause. Id. at 380 (letter from Alex-
ander White to James Madison (Dec. 4, 1788)). On Beverley Randolph's antifederalist views,
see 10 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 383 (letter from Edward Carrington to James
Madison (Jan. 18, 1788)). (RISJORD, supra note 4, at 323 mistakenly states that Harrison
was elected.)
64. 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 340 (letter from George Lee Turberville to
James Madison (November 10, 1788)).
65. N. RIsJORD, supra note 4, at 324 (quoting letter from Theorodorick Bland to Richard
Henry Lee (November 9, 1788)).
66. 2 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AMER-
ICAN FORCES, DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY, AND
FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 205-06 (2d ed. 1843).
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IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL ADOPTION OF A BILL OF RIGHTS
In spite of its triumphs in the state legislature in the fall of 1788,
the antifederalist cause in Virginia suffered a series of setbacks in
the months that followed. First, the movement for a second consti-
tutional convention failed to attract the support of any of the
states ratifying the Constitution, other than New York and Vir-
ginia. (North Carolina and Rhode Island had yet to ratify.) This
meant that the demand for amendments would have to be ad-
dressed to the newly elected Congress. Furthermore, antifederalist
claims that they represented the sentiments of four-fifths of the
state's voters6 7 proved unduly optimistic as federalist candidates
captured seven of the ten congressional elections held in Virginia
on February 2, 1789. The effort to deny Madison a seat in the new
Congress also failed. In an aggressively waged campaign in which
he promised to support limited amendments, Madison triumphed
over his opponent, James Monroe, by a vote of 1308 to 972.68
Outside Virginia, antifederalist candidates fared even worse.
Federalists swept the congressional elections in seven states; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, and Georgia, capturing a total of thirty seats. In Massa-
chusetts, New York, and South Carolina, antifederalist candidates
did better, but their opponents still prevailed in twelve of nineteen
contests. The final results gave the antifederalists only ten of fifty-
nine seats in the House of Representatives, and only Virginia
elected any antifederalists to the Senate.6 9
For Virginia antifederalists, the only positive development dur-
ing the. congressional campaign came when many of the federalist
candidates, including Madison, announced their support for some
amendments.7 ° However, not everyone believed the sincerity of
Madison's conversion. George Mason dismissed Madison's state-
ments as mere campaign promises and refused to take seriously his
claim to be the primary patron of the amendments in the first
Congress. "Perhaps some Milk & Water Propositions may be made
.." Mason wrote, "by Way of throwing out a Tub to the Whale;
67. For a report of the antifederalist predictions of victory, see 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 21, at 40 (letters from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Mar. 30, 1789)).
68. For a description of this campaign, see 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 301-04
(editorial note) and I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 236-42.
69. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989 51-52 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 1989) (listing the roster of the first Congress of the United States).
70. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 26, 56-57.
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but of important & substantial amendments, I have not the least
Hope."' 71 Senator Richard Henry Lee agreed, writing to Patrick
Henry that Madison's "ideas, and those of our convention, on this
subject [amendments], are not similar. '7 2
In spite of the continued complaints of antifederalist spokesmen,
Madison and his federalist supporters seemed to believe that the
1788 legislative session was the high water mark for antifederalism.
The favorable results in the congressional elections and the elec-
tions of nine of twelve federalist candidates as presidential electors
were widely interpreted as signs that the Virginia public had de-
cided to accept the new Constitution. In May, Edward Carrington
wrote to Madison, "[o]ur Antifederal districts have become per-
fectly calm and generally shew [sic] a disposition to acquiesce in
whatever may be the fate of the proposed alterations, relying upon
their meeting with due consideration. a73 Throughout the summer
of 1789, such sentiments were repeatedly voiced in federalist
circles. 74
Nevertheless, Madison felt obligated to fulfill his campaign
promise on the subject of amendments. 75 He began to push for a
bill of rights based upon the first set of recommendations of the
Virginia Ratifying Convention shortly after Congress achieved a
quorum in April of 1789.76 Initially, Madison had trouble gaining
the attention of his federalist colleagues who generally did not
share his sense of urgency on this issue.77 The antifederalist dele-
gation was also reluctant to support Madison's proposals, because
they suspected that they would fall far short of what they believed
necessary to remedy the defects of the new Constitution.78
71. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792 1164 (1970) (letter from George Mason to
John Mason (July 31, 1789)).
72. W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES 388 (1891) [herein-
after, HENRY CORRESPONDENCE] (letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (May 28,
1789)).
73. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 156 (letter from Edward Carrington to James
Madison (May 12, 1789)).
74. See, e.g., id. at 215-16 (letter from Walter Jones to James Madison (June 12, 1789));
id. at 222-25 (letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (June 16, 1789)); id. at
298 (letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (July 19, 1789)); id. at 319-20 (letter
from Archibald Stuart to James Madison (July 31, 1789)); id. at 343 (letter from Alexander
White to James Madison (Aug. 17, 1789)); id. at 393 (letter from Edward Carrington to
James Madison (Sept. 9, 1789)).
75. Bowling, supra note 1, at 234.
76. Id. at 233-35.
77. Id. at 234.
78. Id. at 235.
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Madison's amendments were introduced on June 8, but were not
referred to committee until July 21.1e Discussion on the floor of the
House finally began on August 13, and in the debate that followed,
most of the House antifederalists predictably repudiated
Madison's proposal as inadequate. 80 Aedanus Burke described
Madison's amendments as "frothy and full of wind, formed only to
please the palate,"81 while Thomas Tudor Tucker also from South
Carolina and the brother of Virginia's St. George Tucker, sought
unsuccessfully to convince Congress to add a limitation on the fed-
eral taxing power to Madison's list.
82
A modified version of Madison's Bill of Rights was adopted on
August 24. In the Senate, Lee and Grayson campaigned to expand
the list of amendments to include all of the Virginia proposals.
Writing to Patrick Henry, William Grayson identified the problem
with Madison's amendments.83 They were not objectionable;
rather, they accomplished too little. According to Grayson,
Madison's proposals effected "personal liberty alone, leaving the
great points of the Judiciary, direct taxation, &, to stand as they
are." 84 In Grayson's mind, Madison's true objective was to break
the ranks of the antifederalist movement by dividing it over the
issue of amendments. 85
Grayson and Lee's failure could not have been more complete.
Rather than be convinced of the necessity of reviving the substan-
tive amendments recommended by the Virginia convention, the
Senate greatly weakened the House proposals. 86 Provisions that re-
iterated the constitutional requirement of a strict separation of
powers, guaranteed freedom of conscience and the right to consci-
entious objection to military service, required that appeals to the
United States Supreme Court involve sums of at least one thou-
sand dollars, and guaranteed the right to a trial by jury in one's
own vicinage were abandoned.8 7
79. Id. at 234-35, 239.
80. See id. at 240-41.
81. Id. at 241.
82. Id. at 243-44.
83. 3 HENRY CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 72, at 391 (letter from William Grayson to
Patrick Henry (June 12, 1789)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 3 HENRY CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 72, at 399-401 (letter from Richard Henry Lee
to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789)).
87. See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 213-19 (listing the amendments approved by the
House of Representatives on Aug. 24, 1789, and the Senate on Sept. 9, 1789).
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After the House acquiesced to the Senate modifications, which
reduced the number of amendments from seventeen to twelve,
Grayson wrote to Henry,
The lower house sent up amendments which held out a safeguard to
personal liberty in [a] great many instances, but this disgusted the
Senate. They are so mutilated and gutted that in fact they are good
for nothing, and I believe, as many others do, that they will do more
harm than benefit.""
Although Madison himself objected to the changes, the Senate ver-
sion was accepted by the House with only minor modifications and
forwarded to the states on September 25, 1789.89
V. VIRGINIA DEBATES THE BILL OF RIGHTS
When the Virginia General Assembly convened three weeks
later, it became the first state legislature to consider the twelve
proposed amendments. At the outset, it was unclear whether the
antifederalist representatives would accept the amendments be-
cause their specific content was unobjectionable, or oppose them as
a way of expressing continued support for amendments of a more
substantive nature.
Although Madison's persistence on behalf of the amendments
had gained him new respect among some antifederalists, only a few
antifederalist leaders were satisfied with the result of his efforts. 90
Henry felt that the proposed amendments tended "to injure rather
than serve the cause of liberty" and were only impediments in the
path of those who sought to return power to the people.91 George
Mason, who in contrast to most antifederalists was primarily con-
88. 3 HENRY CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 72, at 405-06 (letter from William Grayson to
Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789)).
89. For the text of these amendments, see Appendix II.
90. See 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 368-69 (letter from Edmund Pendleton to
James Madison (Sept. 2, 1789)); id. at 393 (letter from Edward Carrington to James
Madison (Sept. 9, 1789)); id. at 453 (letter from James Madison to George Washington
(Nov. 20, 1789)).
91. Henry voiced these views on a number of occasions. See, e.g., 3 HENRY CORRESPON-
DENCE, supra note 72, at 398 (letter from Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 28,
1789)); id. at 414 (letter from Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee (Jan. 29, 1790)); accord
id. at 402-04 (letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 27, 1789)); id. at 421-
22 (letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (June 10, 1790)). Henry, however,
spoke favorably of the need for a Bill of Rights during the Ratification Convention. 3 THE
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 43-64 (1836).
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cerned with the protection of the liberties of individuals, was also
dissatisfied with the list as it had emerged from Congress.9 2 Even
Thomas Jefferson, who claimed to be more a federalist than an an-
tifederalist, agreed that additional amendments, which would go
beyond those proposed by Congress, were still desireable.
3
Moreover, nothing had happened since the previous legislative
session to convince the antifederalists that their fears were un-
grounded. Although the actions of the first Congress had resulted
in no immediate threats to Virginia's sovereignty, many Virginia
antifederalists remained suspicious of the new enterprise. The Ju-
diciary Act of 1789's creation of lower federal courts of general ju-
risdiction was a potential threat to state authority, and would have
been unconstitutional if the Virginia amendments had been in ef-
fect. Some antifederalists believed they had seen indications of a
potentially tyrannical central government in the Congressional de-
bate over proper use of formal titles and in the desire of many
northern congressmen to establish the proposed national capital in
Pennsylvania, not on the Potomac as agreed at the convention.,4
While some antifederalists were heartened by the fact that the fed-
eralists in the state's congressional delegation seemed willing to
break from their northern counterparts when Virginia's interests
seemed threatened, this alone was not enough to allay their dis-
trust of the new government. 5
Perhaps the boldest criticism of the new government at the out-
set of the 1789 legislative session came from the state's two United
States senators. In a September 28 letter to the Speaker of the
Virginia House of Delegates, Lee and Grayson formally apologized
to the legislature for their failure to obtain approval for more radi-
cal measures and then issued the. following warning:
It is impossible for us not to see the necessary tendency to consoli-
dated empire in the natural operation of the constitution, if no fur-
ther amended than as now proposed; and it is equally impossible for
us not to be apprehensive for Civil Liberty, when we know of no
instance in the records of history, that shew [sic] a people ruled in
92. 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 1172 (letter from George Mason to Samuel Grif-
fin (Sept. 8, 1789)); 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1789-1790 232 (J. Boyd ed. 1961)
(letter from George Mason to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 16, 1790)).
93. Bowling, supra note 1, at 249 & n. 50.
94. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 59-60.
95. Id. at 60-61.
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freedom, when subject to one undivided government, and inhabiting
a territory so extensive as that of the United States."96
Unless more substantive amendments were adopted, they warned,
the existing United States Constitution would lead to "the annihi-
lation of the state governments. '97
Formal announcement of the proposed amendments reached the
Virginia legislature during the first week of November. Henry at-
tempted to rouse the old coalition to defeat the amendments out-
right, but his initial efforts were met with only limited enthusiasm.
His proposal that the House of Delegates issue a formal resolution
thanking Grayson and Lee for their efforts to obtain more substan-
tial amendments died for lack of support, as did his subsequent
suggestion that debate on the Congressional amendments be post-
poned until after the following year's elections.98 These prelimi-
nary defeats apparently convinced Henry that the legislature was
inclined to ratify the amendments. Consequently, he saw little rea-
son to remain in Richmond and abruptly departed for his home in
Prince Edward County.99
In the debate that followed, the House of Delegates expressed
virtually unanimous approval for the first ten of the twelve pro-
posed amendments.100 This unanimity broke down, however, in the
debate over the proposed eleventh and twelfth amendments' 01
which were later adopted as the ninth and tenth amendments to
the Constitution. Addressing the issue of unenumerated rights and
reserved powers, these amendments provided: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage other retained by the people," and "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
96. Id. at 61 (letter from Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Honorable
Speaker of the House of Representatives in Virginia (Sept. 28, 1789)).
97. Id.
98. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 463-64 (letter from Edward Carrington to
James Madison (Dec. 20, 1789)).
99. See id. Henry also had suffered a major defeat on November 13, when, by a vote of 88
to 51, the House of Delegates defeated his proposal to require the state to accept hemp and
tobacco in payment of public taxes. Id. at 453 (letter from James Madison to George Wash-
ington (Nov. 20, 1789)); HousE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 50 (Nov. 13, 1789). For the signif-
icance of this and related issues in Virginia in the 1780's, see generally Hylton, supra note 8.
100. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 464 (letter from Edward Carrington to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1789)).
101. See id.
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hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."'10
2
To the surprise o many, opposition to these amendments was
led by former Governor Edmund Randolph who argued that the
amendments were too vague. Randolph insisted that the purpose
of the two amendments could be accomplished more effectively by
revised amendments explicitly limiting the powers of the new gov-
ernment, particularly the new Congress. This assertion was the
crux of the antifederalist argument. Initially, the House rejected
both amendments, but on November 30, a rejuvenated coalition of
federalists, who supported the amendments, and antifederalists,
who were uncomfortable with the possibility of Virginia ratifying
only the first ten amendments, reversed the earlier action and rati-
fied the entire list of twelve.10 3 Although there was no recorded roll
call vote on this issue, a contemporary observer reported that the
proposed amendments passed by a majority of thirteen. 10 4
After Henry's departure, the primary objective of the antifeder-
alists in the House of Delegates was not the defeat of the proposed
amendments, but the adoption of a harshly worded resolution crit-
icizing Congress for failing to act in accordance with its earlier in-
structions and calling for the immediate enactment of the remain-
ing proposals suggested in Virginia's ratifying convention. 0 5
Motions to approve the resolution were twice defeated during the
early part of the session, but the debate over the amendments pro-
duced an upswing in antifederalist sentiment. A number of dele-
gates who favored the Congressional amendments, but were con-
cerned that their assent might be misconstrued as a vote of
support for the national government, were now ready to support
such a resolution. Consequently, on December 5, the proposal was
introduced for the third time.10 6
At this point, Henry's departure from Richmond proved to be a
tactical blunder. The role call vote on the resolution resulted in a
sixty-two to sixty-two tie, which was broken by the negative vote
102. See Appendix II-Amendments Proposed by Congress to the States, Sept. 25, 1789.
103. HousE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 90-91 (Nov. 30, 1789).
104. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 471 (letter from George Lee Turberville to
James Madison (Jan. 20, 1790),
105. Madison's correspondent, Hardin Burnley, believed that an opposition to the Con-
gressional power of direct taxation motivated this strategy. See 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 21, at 456 (letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789)).
106. See HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 101-02 (Dec. 5, 1789). The proposal was intro-
duced on this occasion as a substitute for a more moderate resolution that merely urged
Congress to consider the remaining Virginia amendments.
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of federalist Speaker of the House Thomas Matthews.10 1 Had
Henry remained in Richmond, his vote alone would have secured
the resolution's passage. Moreover, his efforts on its behalf proba-
bly would have persuaded approval by additional delegates.108
Even without Henry, a milder resolution calling on Congress to
adopt the remaining Virginia amendments passed the House over-
whelmingly, and the antifederalist block was able to soundly defeat
a subsequent federalist-backed effort to amend the Virginia
Constitution. 0 9
For the twelve amendments, all that now remained was approval
by the Senate. Ordinarily, this approval would have been little
more than a pro forma matter. Under the 1776 Virginia Constitu-
tion, however, legislative powers were concentrated in the lower
house of the assembly. The twenty-four-man Senate lacked the
power to introduce legislation on its own. It was limited instead to
approving, amending, or rejecting legislation initiated by the
House of Delegates." 0 It was widely understood that the real
power rested within the lower house, and the acquiescent Senate
rarely disagreed with the House of Delegates."'
In December, 1789, however, the antifederalist majority in the
Senate abandoned the tradition of institutional deference. In a se-
ries of eight to seven votes, with nine senators either absent or not
voting, the Senate refused to confirm the actions of the House.1 2
Instead, it voted to postpone ratification of four of the twelve
amendments, including the third (which provided for freedom of
press, speech, and religion), the eighth (trial by jury), the eleventh,
and the twelfth."' In taking this action, the Senate majority de-
clared: "We are satisfied that the people of Virginia would never
have ratified the Constitution of the United States, but from a
confident hope and firm persuasion of speedily seeing it much
more materially altered and amended than it would be by ratifying
the propositions lately submitted by Congress to the State Legisla-
107. Id. at 102.
108. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 464-65 (letter from Edward Carrington to
James Madison (Dec. 20, 1789)).
109. See HoUsE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 101-02 (Dec. 5, 1789) (substitute resolution);
id. at 107-11 (Dec. 8, 1789) (state constitutional reform).
110. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 33 & n. 9.
111. Id.
112. See SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 51, at 51-52 (Dec. 8, 11, 12, 1789).
113. Id. at 51; see also id. at 61-66 (Dec. 12, 1789).
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tures." 4 Rejection of the proposed third amendment was justified
because the religious guarantee was not sufficient to protect the
rights of conscience. 5 Although the establishment of a national
church was rightly prohibited, the Senate majority maintained that
the amendment did not rule out the possibility that Congress
might "levy taxes to any amount for the support of religion or its
teachers.""' It was "totally inadequate" and "betray[ed] an unrea-
sonable, unjustifiable, but studied departure from the amendments
proposed by Virginia and other states.11 7 The proposed eighth
amendment was found lacking because it did not guarantee trial by
jury in the defendant's domicile while the eleventh and twelfth
were too vague to place any meaningful restriction on the power of
Congress."'
Supporters of the amendments were furious with the Senate ac-
tion.119 Few believed that the eight-man majority was sincere in its
concern for rights' of conscience. 20 Only one member of the major-
ity had an established legislative record in support of religious
freedom, while three had voted earlier to weaken the landmark
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, and two had voted in 1784
for the continued collection of taxes for the support of religion. 2'
According to one federalist member of the House, opposition in the
Senate was based, not on the amendments per se, but on the ap-
prehension that "the adoption of them at this time will be an ob-
stacle to the chief object of their pursuit, the amendment on the
subject of direct taxation.1 22 Others viewed it as a nakedly politi-
cal attempt to win support for the antifederalist cause from Vir-
114. Id. at 62 (Dec. 12, 1789).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 62-63.
118. Id. at 63-64. Once it became clear that the Senate majority would delay notification
on four of the amendments, the seven federalists in the Senate, with only isolated excep-
tions, voted against ratification of the other amendments. The antifederalists, however,
voted as a bloc in favor of the other eight. Id. at 51-52. (Dec. 8, 1789). The Senate also
divided along federalist/antifederalist lines on the propriety of allowing the majority to
enter its reasons for opposing ratification of the proposed amendments into the Senate
Journal. Id.
119. I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 286-87.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 460 (letter from Hardin Burnley to James
Madison (Dec. 17, 1789)).
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ginia's Baptists and members of other dissenting religious
groups.121
Whatever the motivation of the Senate majority, it was unwilling
to alter its position. Attempts to reconcile the House and Senate
positions failed, and even though eight of the twelve amendments
had been independently ratified by both houses of the legislature,
no further action was taken. 124 Supporters of the amendments were
unwilling to accept ratification without recognition of the rights of
speech, religious liberty, and trial by jury, so consideration was
delayed until another legislature was elected. 125
Because of the surprise turn of events in December, the 1789
legislative session ended as a triumph for the antifederalists. After
two months of debate, the General Assembly had effectively ap-
proved Henry's original motion to postpone voting on the amend-
ments for a year, and the House had adopted a resolution encour-
aging Congress to again consider the Virginia amendments.
Furthermore, the more strongly worded antifederalist resolution
chastising Congress had failed only because of the inopportune ab-
sence of Henry, its primary champion. Certainly the session pro-
vided little evidence that Virginians were comfortable with the new
national Constitution. Even before the session adjourned, federal-
ist Henry Lee, cousin of Richard Henry Lee, wrote to Madison,
"The enmity to govt. is I believe as strong as ever in this state.
Indeed I have no doubt of this fact if the assembly be considered
as a just index of the feelings of the people. Never adventure direct
taxation for years. This event now would be attended with serious
consequences.'1 26
VI. RATIFICATION IN OTHER STATES
Although the actions of the Virginia legislature amounted to a
defeat for the Congressional amendments, other states proved to
be far more receptive. The New Jersey legislature ratified eleven of
the twelve amendments in late November, and shortly after the
conclusion of the Virginia session, both Maryland and the antifed-
123. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 65-66.
124. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 461 (letter from John Dawson to James
Madison (Dec. 17, 1789)); HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 119-20 (Dec. 13, 14, 1789);
SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 51, at 58-59 (Dec. 10, 1789), at 65-66 (Dec. 12, 1789).
125. Id.
126. 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 454-55 (letter from Henry Lee to James
Madison (Nov. 25, 1789)).
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eralist stronghold of North Carolina assented to all twelve. 12 7 The
following month, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Delaware
ratified the amendments; although Delaware rejected the first pro-
posed amendment and New Hampshire rejected the second. 2 '
Massachusetts was next to take up the issue, but with results
that still remain unclear. On January 29, 1790, both houses of the
legislature rejected proposed amendments one and two, and ap-
proved amendments three through eleven. 29 They differed, how-
ever, on the twelfth proposal (the current tenth amendment), with
the Senate approving and the House rejecting it. 30 Three days
later, the House again rejected the twelfth amendment, and the
Senate subsequently concurred in this decision. 131 The legislature
then appointed two committees, one to prepare a bill "declaratory
of their assent," and the other "to take into consideration what
further amendments to the Federal Constitution are necessary to
be proposed to Congress.' 13 2 The first committee apparently never
prepared the required bill and no replacement committee was ever
appointed. As a consequence, Massachusetts did not officially rat-
ify the amendments until 1939.133
Nevertheless, the movement toward ratification continued. Al-
though some New York antifederalists, like their Virginia counter-
parts, found the proposed amendments "trivial, equivocal, and un-
important since the states lacked the power to enforce them,' 1 34
the New York legislature approved all but the second amendment
on February 27, 1790.135 Two weeks later, Pennsylvania ratified all
but the first. The Pennsylvania ratification came in spite of a rein-
vigorated antifederalist opposition led by Samuel Bryan who char-
acterized the proposed amendments as "an opiate prescribed to
subjugate the people" and proclaimed that Madison had gone be-
127. THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1171-1203.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1174-75.
132. Id. at 1175-76 (letter from Christopher Gore to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1791))
(referring to first committee); id. at 1176 (citing New York Journal and Weekly Register
(Feb. 11, 1790)(referring to second committee)).
133. Whether this was an oversight on the part of the committee or a conscious decision
to withhold approval is not recorded. See generally D. P. MEYERS, MASSACHUSETTS AND THE
FIRST TEN AMENDMENTS (1936); E. DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 49-50.
134. Bowling, supra note 1, at 248 (letter from DeWitt Clinton to Charles Clinton (Feb. 8,
1790)).
135. Id. at 347.
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yond Machiavelli in his efforts to deceive the people.116 In June,
Rhode Island ratified the Constitution and all of the proposed
amendments.'
With the Rhode Island ratification, ten of the necessary eleven
states had notified Congress of their approval of all or most of the
proposed amendments. At this point, however, the movement for
ratification stalled. Staunchly federalist Connecticut and Georgia,
opposed to any changes in the Constitution, had refused to con-
sider the amendments, and Massachusetts declined to send Con-
gress official notice of its apparent ratification of nine of the twelve
amendments.13 8
Approval by Virginia was, therefore, still necessary in the fall of
1790. However, by the time the Virginia legislature reconvened in
October, ratification seemed less likely than it had a year earlier.
Controversial actions of the new national government now seemed
to vindicate the warnings issued by Henry and his colleagues over
the previous three years, and Virginia's growing opposition to these
policies caused attention to shift away from the proposed
amendments.
VII. THE REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The estrangement of many Virginia federalists from the new
government began on January 14, 1790, when Secretary of the
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, issued his First Report on the Pub-
lic Credit.'39 Hamilton's report called for the redemption of all se-
curities issued by the Continental Congress at face value plus four
percent and, more significantly, for the federal assumption of the
debts of the individual states.140
Virginia's political leaders, federalist and antifederalist alike, op-
posed these proposals. Even Madison, who had supported the idea
of national assumption of state debts in 1783, joined the opposi-
tion, as did four of his six federalist colleagues in the Virginia Con-
gressional delegation.14 ' While the funding and assumption acts
136. Id.
137. THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1171-1203.
138. Id.
139. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 68.
140. Id. For Hamilton's financial policies, see E.J. FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 (1961); J. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION (1959).
141. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 70-73; I. BRANT, supra note 4, at 296-305.
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became the focus of Virginia's hostility, the decision on the part of
Congress to discuss Quaker anti-slavery petitions also did little to
reassure disgruntled Virginians.142
These policies revived antifederalist fortunes in the spring and
summer of 1790. Henry Lee wrote to Madison that "[Patrick]
Henry already is considered as a prophet, his predictions are daily
verifying. His declarations with respect to the division of interests
which would exist under the constitution.., has [sic] been undeni-
ably proved." '143 David Stuart, another Virginia federalist, wrote to
President Washington, "If Mr. Henry has sufficient boldness to
aim the blow at its existence, which he has threatened, I think he
can never meet with a more favorable opportunity.
'
"
144
VIII. 1790 SESSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
When the General Assembly convened in October 1790, there
was little discussion of the status of the proposed Bill of Rights.
Instead, a coalition of antifederalists and disgruntled federalists
supported a resolution introduced by Patrick Henry which de-
clared that the act providing for the assumption of state debts was
"repugnant to the constitution of the United States, as it goes to
the exercise of a power not expressly granted to the General Gov-
ernment. 1 , 5 A federalist-backed alternative, which would have
condemned the Assumption Act on all grounds but its constitu-
tionality was defeated by a vote of eighty-eight to forty-seven.14 6
Immediately thereafter, the House approved Henry's resolution
denouncing the Act as unconstitutional by a seventy-eight to fifty-
two margin.1 47
The General Assembly sent an even more critical message to
Congress, when it approved the Address of the General Assembly
142. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 76.
143. See 13 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 136-37 (letter from Henry Lee to James
Madison (Apr. 3, 1790)).
144. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 77 (quoting letter from David Stuart to George
Washington (June 2, 1790)).
145. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 78; HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 35-36 (Nov. 3,
1790).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 36. The resolution was subsequently approved by the Senate. SENATE JOURNAL,
supra note 51, at 77-78 (Dec. 21, 1790). Of the 42 known antifederalists in the House of
Delegates, 38 supported Henry's resolution denouncing the assumption of state debts, while
only six of 30 federalists did so. Of the remaining 58, whose prior positions are unknown, 34
supported the resolution, and 24 opposed it. N. RISFORD, supra note 4, at 395-96.
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of the Commonwealth of Virginia to the United States in Con-
gress Assembled.148 The address accused the government generally,
and Alexander Hamilton in particular, of imitating English finan-
cial policies, of desiring to "perpetuate a large monied interest,"
and of discriminating against those states, like Virginia, that had
paid off much of their own debt. The address also denounced the
Assumption Act as unconstitutional.
149
The assumption crisis also seemed to vindicate the antifederalist
opponents of the proposed amendments. No one suggested that
the ratification of the Congressionally approved amendments
would have prevented Congress from adopting Hamilton's plan,
and this was exactly the problem that the antifederalists predicted.
The proposed amendments dealt only with individual liberties.
They offered no protection when the national government uncon-
stitutionally discriminated against the interests of an individual
state. Only more substantial amendments to the Constitution, spe-
cifically designed to limit the financial powers of the federal gov-
ernment, could accomplish this objective. Consequently, the still
unratified congressional amendments were not an issue during the
1790 legislative session.
IX. VIRGINIA RATIFIES THE BILL OF RIGHTS
By 1791, a new political alignment was in place in Virginia. Anti-
federalists had combined with a significant number of disillusioned
federalists to form what would soon be known as the Republican
Party.' 50 The new coalition controlled the General Assembly. The
Commonwealth's Congressional delegation was united by the oppo-
sition of its members to the financial, and later the foreign policies
of the Washington administration. By 1791, it was also clear that
for better or worse the Constitution ratified in 1788 was going to
remain in effect. The key to limiting federal usurpation of power
lay, not in the hopes of a different constitution, but in the develop-
ment of a theory of strict construction for the existing one and, as
148. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 141-42 (Dec. 16, 1790).
149. OLD DOMINION, supra note 4, at 80-82. As Richard Beeman has noted, an earlier
draft of the Address, approved by the House but not the Senate, appeared to anticipate the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of the late 1790's by raising the possibility of state legis-
lative nullification of unconstitutional acts of congress. Id. at 80.
150. Id. at 90. Norman Risjord's study of the subsequent careers of 61 federalist members
of the 1788 Virginia Ratifying Convention revealed that 38 supported the Washington ad-
ministration in the 1790's while 23 joined the ranks of the Republican opposition. Risjord,
The Virginia Federalists, 33 J. OF S. HIST. 486, 487 (1967).
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soon as possible, control of the national government. Even Patrick
Henry acknowledged this change. His denunciation of Hamilton's
policies as "repugnant to the Constitution" during the 1790 legisla-
tive session implied that the debate over the legitimacy of the Con-
stitution itself had ended,151 and after the conclusion of session, he
privately conveyed his acceptance of the new Constitution to
James Monroe. 152
In this revised political climate, the participants ceased to view
the Congressional amendments as a referendum on the national
government. Even so, supporters of the amendments did not as-
sume that ratification would be automatic in the fall of 1791. More
than a year had passed since any state had ratified the proposed
amendments, and the admission of Vermont to the union as the
fourteenth state on March 14, 1791 had raised the number of nec-
essary states from ten to eleven. When the General Assembly con-
vened in October 1791, the challenge confronting the supporters of
the amendments was to present them in such a way that the issue
of ratification could be kept separate from the state's attitude to-
ward the Federalist national government. Presumably, this task
was made easier by the retirement of Patrick Henry from the legis-
lature, 15 3 and by the fact that five of the eight antifederalist sena-
tors who had defeated the amendments in 1789 had also left the
legislature.15 4
Nevertheless, the strategy adopted by the proponents of the
amendments in 1791 was a cautious one. Rather than introduce the
amendments as a group, as had been done in 1789, only the pro-
posed first amendment (which pertained to congressional appor-
tionment and guaranteed that the House of Representatives would
contain at least one representative for every fifty thousand people)
was presented to the House of Delegates. This amendment passed
without controversy on October 25, and was ratified by the Senate
on November 3.155 Notification of the ratification was immediately
dispatched to Congress. 56
151. N. RISJORD, supra note 4, at 395.
152. PATRICK HENRY, supra note 4, at 175-76 (letter from Patrick Henry to James Monroe
(Jan. 24, 1791)).
153. Id. at 175-76.
154. Tarter, supra note 3, at 14.
155. HousE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 14 (Oct. 25, 1791); SENATE JOURNAL, supra note
51, at 9 (Nov. 3, 1791).
156. THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1201. Yet the first amendment
"never received the approval of enough legislatures to become part of the Constitution."
Tarter, supra note 3, at 14.
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Convinced that opposition to the Congressional amendments
was no longer the policy of the antifederalists and their allies, sup-
porters introduced the remaining eleven amendments. 157 The
amendments were then passed by the House on December 5, with
only a single dissenting vote.158 Apparently, Henry did make a
brief appearance in Richmond while the General Assembly was in
session, and federalist Francis Corbin was convinced that he might
try to derail the amendments in the Senate as had been done two
years earlier. 159 However, Henry departed Richmond on December
7, and the Senate approved the remaining amendments eight days
later' 60 Official notification of ratification reached Congress on De-
cember 30.161
Unknown to members of the Virginia General Assembly, Ver-
mont had ratified the full slate of amendments on November 3.
Official notification of that state's ratification, however, did not
reach Congress until January 18, 1792, more than two weeks after
Virginia's had become official. The ratification by the two states
brought to eleven the number of states which had adopted pro-
posed amendments three through eleven. 16 2 The adopted amend-
ments officially became amendments one through ten of the
United States Constitution on March 1, 1792, when Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson notified the governors of the several states
of "the ratifications by three fourths of the Legislatures of the Sev-
eral States, of certain articles in addition and amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, proposed by Congress to the
said Legislatures.''163
157. Francis Corbin discussed the strategy of the amendment supporters. 14 MADISON PA-
PERS, supra note 21, at 140-41 (letter from Francis Corbin to James Madison (Dec. 7, 1791)).
158. Id. at 141; HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 44, at 103 (Dec. 5, 1791).
159. 14 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 141 (letter from Francis Corbin to James
Madison).
160. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 51, at 60 (Dec. 15, 1791).
161. THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1201-02. The acts themselves are
recorded in W. W. HENING, 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619 (1823) 327-29.
162. Proposed amendments one and two, however, had been endorsed by only nine and
eight states, respectively.
163. THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1203 (letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to the Governors of the Several States (Mar. 1, 1792)).
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X. VIRGINIA'S RATIFICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AN
APPRAISAL
At the time it finally adopted the proposed amendments that
now make up the Bill of Rights, the Virginia General Assembly
gave little evidence that it believed it had participated in an event
of historical significance. Even Madison and his correspondents ex-
pressed little sense of elation. When Francis Corbin wrote to
Madison to report that the amendments had been approved by the
Senate, he dispensed of the matter in a single sentence and de-
voted most of his letter to reporting his plan for a resolution con-
gratulating the National Assembly of France on the establishment
of a new French constitution.164 Moreover, Madison's own corre-
spondence in the following months makes no mention of Virginia's
ratification.165
The events of the preceding two years, as well as the new contro-
versy over the constitutionality of the recently chartered Bank of
the United States, had established that the great constitutional is-
sues of the 1790's were not going to be resolved by a Bill of Rights.
Further evidence was provided in 1798 by the Congressional adop-
tion of the Federalist Sedition Act, which made it a crime to criti-
cize the national government and its leadership, in spite of the
guarantee of free speech in the new first amendment. 66
The limited significance of the Bill of Rights at the time of its
adoption was not lost on contemporaries. Alexander Hamilton,
writing in 1801, noted that in its final form, the Bill of Rights had
accomplished "scarcely any of the important objections which were
urged [by the critics of the new constitution], leaving the structure
of the government, and the mass and distribution of its powers
where they were. "167 The amendments were, in Hamilton's mind,
"too insignificant to be with any sensible man a reason for being
reconciled to the system if he thought it originally bad.""6 There
is also little reason to believe that Madison himself ever departed
fundamentally from his initial characterization of his amendments
164. 14 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 151-52 (letter from Francis Corbin to James
Madison (Dec. 15, 1791)).
165. See id. at 152-160.
166. See generally J. MILLER, CRIsIs IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
(1951)(discussing Federalist Sedition Act).
167. 25 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 346 (1977)(Hamilton, "An Address to the Elec-
tors of the State of New York" (Mar. 21, 1801)).
168. Id.
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as the product of political expedience. In an 1821 letter to John G.
Jackson, in which he reflected upon the events of the late 1780's,
Madison described the amendments he introduced on the floor of
Congress as "safe, if not necessary" and "politic, if not obliga-
tory."'169 Finally, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story, writing from the vantage point of the late 1820's, echoed
Hamilton's evaluation, attributing the original demand for a Bill of
Rights to a, "matter of very exaggerated declamation and party
zeal, for the mere purpose of defeating the Constitution. 1 7 0
Prominent antifederalists also continued to downplay its signifi-
cance. In his 1803 commentary on the United States Constitution,
St. George Tucker argued that the addition of the Bill of Rights to
the Constitution was justified, not because it actually added any
new protection of liberty, but because it provided citizens with in-
formation as to the nature of their rights.17' Tucker explained that
"[b]y reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws, every man
of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his own
rights, and know when they are violated; a circumstance, of itself,
sufficient, I conceive, to counterbalance every argument against
one." 72 As to whether the addition of the Bill of Rights had satis-
fied the concerns that had led many to oppose the Constitution,
Tucker's answer was clearly that it had not. Throughout his 238-
page survey of the United States Constitution, he noted the need
for additional amendments to "remedy some radical defects in the
system."' 73 He concluded his observations with an enumeration of
the "most important of those [amendments] which have not yet
received the approbation of both houses of congress,' 74 by which
he meant the substantive proposals advanced by the Virginia Rati-
fying Convention.
169. 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 244 (1865) (letter from James
Madison to Andrew Jackson (Dec. 27, 1821)).
170. R. RUTLAND, supra note 1, at 218 (quoting 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 602 (1873)).
171. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Appendix I, at 308 (1803).
172. Id. at Appendix I, Note D at 308.
173. Id. at 372.
174. Id. at 372-75.
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XI. CONCLUSION
The Virginia ratification of the Bill of Rights was part of the
fabric of Virginia politics of the late eighteenth century, and as
such, it offers the modern citizen little direct guidance as to either
the meaning of its provisions or the proper role it ought to play in
the contemporary American constitutional system. The experience
did, however, help establish a pattern of divergent attitudes to-
ward the Constitution, which ultimately would be a recurring
theme in the history of the Old Dominion.
The federalist-antifederalist division over the meaning of the
Constitution in the 1780's had its counterpart in the debates be-
tween Chief Justice John Marshall and his critics, Spencer Roane
and John Taylor of Caroline, in the 1810's and 20's, between the
representatives of the east and west in the state constitutional con-
ventions of 1830 and 1850, between the unionists and the seces-
sionists in 1860 and 1861, between the founders and readjusters of
the post-Civil War era, and in the twentieth century, between
those who sought to impose the Constitution as a barrier between
Virginia and the civil rights movement and the modern welfare
state and those who accepted the constitutional holdings of the
modern Supreme Court. There are two constitutional traditions in
Virginia, one local in its orientation, the other national. It is, of
course, the resilience of the former, traceable in its origins to the
antifederalists of the 1780's, that has given the state its distinctive
place in American constitutional history.175
Finally, it is ironic that the Bill of Rights has in the twentieth
century, come to stand for a constitutional principle quite different
from what late eighteenth century Virginians understood it to re-
present. Initially endorsed as a mechanism for protecting the rights
of the individuals from an oppressive national government and for
assuring the defenders of state sovereignty that they had nothing
to fear, it now, through the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment, operates as a powerful limitation on
the sovereign power of the states. It has provided a constitutional
mechanism through which a single, uniform national standard has
been imposed on the states, and in doing so has led to a realization
175. On the survival of antifederalism as a political and constitutional force, see Ellis,
"The Persistence of Antifederalism after 1789" in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 1, at
295-314.
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of the very fear that led Virginia antifederalists to oppose its ratifi-
cation more than two centuries ago.
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APPENDIX I
Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention
June 27, 1788
That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and secur-
ing from encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the
People in some such manner as the following;
First, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when
they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity,
among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
Second, That all power is riaturally vested in and consequently
derived from the people; that Magistrates, therefore, are their
trustees and agents and at all times amenable to them.
Third, That Government ought to be instituted for the common
benefit, protection and security of the People; and that the doc-
trine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is
absurd slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.
Fourth, That no man or set of Men are entitled to exclusive or
seperate [sic] public emoluments or privileges from the commu-
nity, but in Consideration of public services; which not being de-
scendible, neither ought the offices of Magistrate, Legislator or
Judge, or any other public office to be hereditary.
Fifth, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of
Government should be seperate [sic] and distinct, and that the
members of the two first may be restrained from oppression by
feeling and participating the public burthens, they should, at fixt
periods be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the
people; and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elec-
tions; in which all or any part of the former members to be eligible
or ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and
the laws shall direct.
Sixth, That elections of representatives in the legislature ought
to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of
permanent common interest with and attachment to the Commu-
nity ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or
fee can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own
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consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor can they be
bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented
for the public good.
Seventh, That all power of suspending laws or the execution of
laws by any authority, without the consent of the representatives
of the people in the legislature is injurious to their rights, and
ought not to be exercised.
Eighth, That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man
hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to
be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence
and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial
by an impartial Jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous
consent he cannot be found guilty, (except in the government of
the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself.
Ninth, That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or dis-
seised of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed
or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, lib-
erty or property but by the law of the land.
Tenth, That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to
a remedy to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the
same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied
nor delayed.
Eleventh, That in controversies respecting property, and in suits
between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is one of the
greatest Securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain
sacred and inviolable.
Twelfth, That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by
recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in
his person, property or character. He ought to obtain right and jus-
tice freely without sale, compleatly [sic] and without denial,
promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regula-
tions contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.
Thirteenth, That excessive Bail ought not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Fourteenth, That every freeman has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and siezures [sic] of his person, his papers
and his property; all warrants, therefore, to search suspected
places, or sieze [sic] any freeman, his papers or property, without
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information upon Oath (of affirmation of a person religiously
scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are
grievous and oppressive; and all general Warrants to search sus-
pected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, without spe-
cially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and
ought not to be granted.
Fifteenth, That th. people have a right peaceably to assemble
together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their Rep-
resentatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or ap-
ply to the legislature for redress of grievances.
Sixteenth, That the people have a right to freedom of speech,
and of writing and publishing their Sentiments; but the freedom of
the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not
to be violated.
Seventeenth, That the people have a right to keep and bear
arms; that a well regulated Militia composed of the body of the
people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a
free State. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circum-
stances and protection of the Community will admit; and that in
all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and
governed by the Civil power.
Eighteenth, That no Soldier in time of peace ought to be quar-
tered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time
of war in such manner only as the laws direct.
Nineteenth, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to em-
ploy another to bear arms in his stead.
Twentieth, That religion or the duty which we owe to our Crea-
tor, and the manner of discharging it can be directed only by rea-
son and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men
have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of
religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no partic-
ular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by
Law in preference to others.
AMENDMENTS TO THE BODY OF THE CONSTITUTION
First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain
every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitu-
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tion delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the de-
partments of the Foederal [sic] Government.
Second, That there shall be one representative for every thirty
thousand, according to the Enumeration or Census mentioned in
the Constitution, until the whole number of representatives
amounts to two hundred; after which that number shall be contin-
ued or encreased [sic] as the Congress shall direct, upon the princi-
ples fixed by the Constitution by apportioning the Representatives
of each State to some greater number of people from time to time
as population encreases [sic].
Third, When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall
immediately inform the Executive power of each State of the quota
of such state according to the Census herein directed, which is pro-
posed to be thereby raised; And if the Legislature of any State
shall pass a law which shall be effectual for raising such quota at
the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by Con-
gress shall not be collected, in such State.
Fourth, That the members of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any civil
office under the authority of the United States, during the time for
which they shall respectively be elected.
Fifth, That the Journals of the proceedings of the Senate and
House of Representatives shall be published at least once in every
year, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or mil-
itary operations, as in their judgment require secrecy.
Sixth, That a regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published at least once in
every year.
Seventh, That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the
concurrence of two thirds of the whole number of the members of
the Senate; and no Treaty ceding, contracting, restraining or sus-
pending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any
of them or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the
American seas, or navigating the American rivers shall be [made]
but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall
any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three
fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses
respectively.
Eighth, That no navigation law, or law regulating Commerce
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shall be passed without the consent of two thirds of the Members
present in both houses.
Ninth, That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised
or kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of'
the members present in both houses.
Tenth, That no soldier shall be inlisted [sic] for any longer term
than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term
than the continuance of the war.
Eleventh, That each State respectively shall have the power to
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining it's own Militia,
whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same.
That the Militia shall not be subject to Martial law, except when
in actual service in time of war, invasion, or rebellion; and when
not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only
to such fines, penalties and punishments as shall be directed or
inflicted by the laws of its own State.
Twelfth, That the exclusive power of legislation given to Con-
gress over the Foederal [sic] Town and its adjacent District and
other places purchased or to be purchased by Congress of any of
the States shall extend only to such regulations as respect the po-
lice and good government thereof.
Thirteenth, That no person shall be capable of being President
of the United States for more than eight years in any term of six-
teen years.
Fourteenth, That the judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such courts of Admiralty
as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish in any of
the different States: The Judicial power shall extend to all cases in
Law and Equity arising under treaties made, or which shall be
made under the authority of the United States; to all cases affect-
ing ambassadors other foreign ministers and consuls; to all cases of
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or
[more] States, and between parties claiming lands under the grants
of different States. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign
ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party,
the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction; in all other cases
before mentioned the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion as to matters of law only: except in cases of equity, and of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in which the Supreme Court
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
But the judicial power of the United States shall extend to no case
where the cause of action shall have originated before the ratifica-
tion of this Constitution; except in disputes between States about
their Territory, disputes between persons claiming lands under the
grants of different States, and suits for debts due to the United
States.
Fifteenth, That in criminal prosecutions no man shall be re-
strained in the exercise of the usual and accustomed right of chal-
lenging or excepting to the Jury.
Sixteenth, That Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere in
the times, places, or manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives or either of them, except when the legislature of
any State shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion, or rebel-
lion to prescribe the same.
Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare that Congress
shall not exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner
whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that they may
be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers
where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely for
greater caution.
Eighteenth, That the laws ascertaining the compensation to
Senators and Representatives for their services be postponed in
their operation, until after the election of Representatives immedi-
ately succeeding the passing thereof; that excepted, which shall
first be passed on the Subject.
Nineteenth, That some Tribunal other than the Senate be pro-
vided for trying impeachments of Senators.
Twentieth, That the Salary of a Judge shall not be encreased
[sic] or diminished during his continuance in Office, otherwise than
by general regulations of Salary which may take place on a revision
of the subject at stated periods of not less than seven years to com-
mence from the time such Salaries shall be first ascertained by
Congress.
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APPENDIX II
Amendments Proposed by Congress to the States
September 25, 1789
Article the first ... After the first enumeration required by the
first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative
for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one
hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Con-
gress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representa-
tives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand
persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Con-
gress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representa-
tives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand
persons.
Article the second. .. No law, varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, un-
til an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
Article the third. . . Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
Article the fourth . . . A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Article the fifth. . . No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time
of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Article the sixth . . . The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
Article the seventh . . . No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
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War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Article the eighth . . . In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Article the ninth . . . In suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
Article the tenth . . . Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
Article the eleventh . . . The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.
Article the twelfth . . . The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
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